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National Conte xt?
Gregory D. Saxton
College at Brockport , State University of New York
Michelle A. Benson
University at Buffalo , State University of New York
Anal y ses of the determinants
of anti-immigrant
hostility
remain underdeveloped
in th e literature . Current research is diminished by comp eting claims over the prima cy of economic , ideological , contextual,
or sociodemographic factors . To consolidate past research and
work towards a more coherent theory of attitudinal
hostility, we argue that it is first necessary to disaggregate
the broad notion of hostility into "social" and "policy "
hostility . We use the 30 t h Eurobarometer
on Immigrants
an d Outgroups to test the ability of the economic vulnerabili ty, ideology , and national context arguments to explain levels of socially and politically hostile attitudes to
immigrants in five countries of the European Union . The
resul ts confirm that not only are social and policy hostility distinct , but ideological factors-both
new and old provide a more cogent account of hostility than either
economics or national context . The study finds that attitudinal hostility fundamentally
derives from a conjunction of low levels of education and a powerful form of
"ideological
hostility " that encompasses
old-fashioned
racism, traditional
right-wing ideology, and materialist
value orientations . .
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T

he last two decades of the twentieth century saw a wave
of ugly anti-immigrant backlashes in Western Europe.
Coming as they did after a decade of high unemployment
and working-class insecurity, many popular analysts reached the
conclusion that "hard times breed hard thoughts." Whatever the
association, parties of the "new radical right" (Kitschelt 1995),
such as Belgium's Vlaams Blok, France's Front National and
Germany's Republikaner, have been able to parlay the confluence of economic insecurity and anti-foreigner sentiment into a
viable electoral message.
Some (e.g., Dalton 1990) argue that such hostile attitudes are
inextricable concomitants of the economic and social transformations of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
They argue that in the postindustrial economy there are a large
and growing number of individuals in insecure social and economic positions; ipso facto, there will be a large and growing
hostility to the presence of "foreigners" in the domestic economy
and society. The argument has strong intuitive appeal. Still, others have persuasively argued that either ideological predispositions (Hoskin 1985, 1991; Pettigrew 1998) or nation-specific
factors (Kitschelt 1995; Lahav 1997; Legge 1996; Schmitter
1983; Studlar 1977) are the primary determinants of hostile attitudes to immigrant "outsiders" in the European Union.
Which explanation is most powerful? We attempt to provide
an answer by testing and comparing the ability of the economic
vulnerability, ideology, and national context arguments to explain levels of attitudinal hostility in five of the most developed
nations of Western Europe. Using data derived from the German,
British, French, Belgian, and Dutch sections of Eurobarometer
30 (Reif and Melich 1991), that focused on the issue of immigrants and outgroups, we demonstrate, first, that attitudinal hostility can be usefully disaggregated into distinct "social" and
"policy" dimensions. Results from multiple regression analyses
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on social and policy hostility then show that ideology, in conjunction with education, offers a more powerful explanation of
hostility than either economic vulnerability or national context.

TIIEORETICALBACKGROUND
The countries of Western Europe have never considered
themselves "immigrant" nations (Pettigrew 1998). Instead, they
were historically "emigrant" nations-filling the cities of North
America with their opportunity-hungry masses. Because of this
perception, these countries lacked a sense that immigration was
normal (Pettigrew 1998). After World War II, however, levels of
immigration in northern Europe (especially in France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) steadily increased as migrants
from former colonial countries began to arrive in large numbers.
Around the same time, beginning in the 1950s, the post-war economic boom left the countries of northern Europe with looming
labor shortages. The call went out for workers from the south of
Europe (and, later, from the Maghreb and Turkey) to migrate
north and temporarily fill the positions needed to keep the boom
going.
Significant problems with such arrangements first surfaced in
the 1970s, when the oil shocks led to high rates of inflation, decreased economic growth, and persistent high unemployment
rates. By the early 1980s, most of the rich states of northern and
Western Europe awoke to the realization that they had become
immigrant societies. It became exceedingly clear that neither the
ex-colonial immigrants nor the guestworkers (nor, later on, the
refugees) were going home. Lacking both an immigrant tradition
and a popular "melting pot" metaphor directed at the assimilation of foreign-born groups (Pettigrew 1998), tensions began to
escalate while political solutions were debated.
Scholars have responded by focusing on the hardships faced
by the foreign-born migrants in integrating themselves into the
VOL. 31 2003
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new immigrant societies of Western Europe (e.g., Castles and
Kosack 1985; Hoskin 1991; Hollifield 1992). One of the most
troubling developments to receive attention has been the rise of
hostility to these "new Europeans" (Pettigrew 1998). Though the
range of concepts covered under the rubric of "hostility" in these
studies is quite broad, most of the literature can be associated
with one of three primary forms of hostility: (1) physical, (2)
electoral, and (3) attitudinal.
Forms of Hostility
Physical Hostility. We are all familiar with such repugnant
images as young neo-Nazi thugs thrashing Turkish immigrants in
German marketplaces. Because of the severity and sensationalism of the actions of this relatively small core of right-wing extremists, physical hostility has garnered a large portion of the
attention in both the popular and academic literature (e.g.,
Bjorgo and Witte 1993; Koopmans 1995; Willems 1995; Witte
1995). Though some of these studies focus on the impact of
physical and psychological hardship resulting from economic
distress (e.g., McLaren 1999), the majority take anomie and the
lack of social capital among disaffected youth as central explanatory variables (e.g., Hagan, Merkens and Boehnke 1995).
Electoral Hostility. There is also a relatively large literature
dealing with the causes of electoral manifestations of hostility as
seen in the rising vote for the new radical right parties in most
West European countries (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Pettigrew
1998; von Beyme 1988). Many of these studies have focused on
the correlations between hostile attitudes and physical hostility
and votes for anti-immigrant political parties. For example, von
Beyme (1988, I 4) found that there is a disparity between rightwing voting and right-wing attitudes. Another study on the rise
of the far right in the former West Germany revealed the basic
similarity between certain Republikaner and Christian DemocTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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ratic voters, who in turn are both quite distinct from the voters
for the extreme neo-Nazi German National Democratic Party
(Kuechler 1990, 160).
Attitudinal Hostility. Other examinations focus on that presumably large minority of the citizenry who hold hostile attitudes
towards foreigners. These citizens are likely behind the rise of
the new radical right parties, and many may even tacitly support
the actions of the physically violent extremists. In effect, attitudinal hostility is often presumed to be a precondition for both
physical and electoral hostility. Attitudinal hostility, however, is
itself so broad that-in the interests of theory building-it is essential to further delineate the concept.
Categories of Hostile Attitudes
Racism. In general, there are three main categories of hostile
attitudes. Racism (feelings of cultural, ethnic, or racial superiority) is the first, and the basest, of the hostile sentiments. It is,
presumably, a fundamental pre-detenninant of both electoral and
physical hostility. We posit that it is also an antecedent condition
for other fonns of attitudinal hostility; preliminary evidence by
Pettigrew (I 998) corroborates this. A great deal of research has
been conducted on the detenninants of this traditional fonn of
prejudice (e.g., Meertens and Pettigrew 1997), especially in the
American context (for a good overview, see Snidennan and Piazza 1993).
Social Hostility. A second sub-category of hostile attitudes is
the negative affect that people may have towards societal outgroups in their community. One of the primary manifestations of
such hostility is negative opinions regarding the impact that immigrants have on the host society. Because of the hostility to the
societal impact of a minority group's presence, we refer to this as
"social" hostility. Measures designed to tap such negative assessments (for good examples, see Hoskin 1985 and Quillian
VOL. 31 2003
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1995) are often based on responses to the following types of survey instruments: "Having Turks in your neighborhood lowers
your property value"; "Turks exploit social security benefits;"
and "Their presence is one of the causes of delinquency and violence."
Policy Hostility. While social hostility taps hostile assessments of immigrants' value to or impact on society, policy hostility taps support for hostile actions towards those immigrants in
the policy arena. Such hostility manifests itself primarily through
support for government policies designed to curtail the political
or economic rights of the immigrant and outgroup minorities.
Policy hostility measures attitudes concerning the proper political treatment of Europe's millions of non-permanent residents;
such feelings are, consequently, relevant for this study.
There would seem to be a connection between negative assessments of a minority's impact on society and support for hostile immigration policies. However, are the determinants of
social and policy hostility really the same? Neiman and Fernandez (1998), used surveys tapping attitudes towards the growing
legal and illegal immigrant communities in California to show
that the answer is "not necessarily." In California, at least, there
is a significant difference between respondents' assessments of
an immigrant group's general impact on society and respondents'
preferences for state policies directed at that group (e.g., California's Proposition 187). One form of hostility does not automatically translate into the other.
Both social and policy hostility would, ostensibly, also be
highly correlated with the first form of attitudinal hostility, racism. We posit that social and policy hostility is shaped by racist
attitudes. 1 The relationships are not deterministic, however. Nei1

Evidence of the connection between prejudice and attitudes regarding immigrants'
rights is provided by Meertens and Pettigrew ( 1997).
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ther social nor policy hostility is fully dependent on hostile racist
attitudes. If, for example, one agrees with the statement that
property values go down when minorities move into the
neighborhood (indicative of socially hostile attitudes), it could
simply be an acknowledgment of other peoples' prejudices.
Similarly, hostile policy preferences are not necessarily the direct
product of blind prejudice (and, in fact, are even further removed
from such sentiments than social hostility). In the United States,
for example, there are many Hispanic Americans among the supporters of clampdowns on illegal immigration. Consequently,
racism is construed as one of many antecedent conditions of social and policy hostility.
In short, we have identified two forms of attitudinal hostility
that are worthy of individual attention. Nevertheless, despite the
fact that socially and politically hostile attitudes are highly relevant to the day-to-day quality of life of millions of EU residents
without secure citizenship status, the extant literature remains
underdeveloped. The present study aims to help correct this deficit through an in-depth examination of the determinants of social
and policy hostility.
THEORETICALEXPLANATIONSOFATIITUDINALHOSTILITY

There are three main approaches to explaining cross-national
differences in attitudinal hostility: (1) national context, (2) economics, and (3) ideology.
National Context
Explanations that focus on non-economic nation-specific factors come in two varieties . The first variety is primarily idiographic; it searches for the roots of hostility in the particular
psychology, history, or political culture of a nation. Such studies
are frequently directed at Germany, where analysts argue that
xenophobic attitudes are attributable to "German identity"
VOL. 31 2003
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(Legge 1996), to renewed manifestations of "authoritarian"
German personality traits,2 to a lack of support for the current
system,3 or to expressions of a "latent" German racism. While
such may have been the case in the past, these arguments now
seem rather tenuous: there is a plethora of counter-evidence outlining the strength of German support for democratic institutions
and the comparability of such support with other West European
and North American nations (e.g., von Beyme 1988; Dalton
1990).
A second type of nation-specific explanation looks to the
more readily comparable social, legal, economic, political, or
demographic factors apparent in a given nation for answers to
the quandary of attitudinal hostility. For example, Donley Studlar
( 1977) found a reasonable explanation of hostility in Great Britain using his notion of "social context," which Studlar took to be
the conjunction of spatial proximity, employment levels, and
housing shortages. Subsequently, myriad country-specific studies
have focused on Germany, where the emphasis is usually on such
features as the asylum law, the unresolved status of the Gastarbeiter, the size of the refugee flows, or inadequate housing, inter
alia (for an overview, see Schmitter 1983).
The contextual factors explored in such studies are amenable
to cross-national examination. Scholars have met with varying
degrees of success investigating the cause of the differences in
anti-immigrant hostility among "host" West European nations by
comparing institutions, political opportunity structures (Kitschelt
1995), refugee laws, political party affiliations and systems (La2

For instance, Kuechler ( I 990, 159): "I assert that the emergence of the Republikaner
signifies the continued-though long latent- prevalence of authoritarian belief systems
in significant parts of the German public."
3
The classic example of this comes from Almond and Verba (I 963, 429): "Though there
is relatively widespread satisfaction with political output, this is not matched by more
general system affect."
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hav 1997), economic conditions (Quillian 1995), employment
levels, and the relative size of immigrant populations (Quillian
1995).
Admittedly, it is plausible that the national context has a relevance to and impact on manifestations of hostility. Nevertheless,
a priori theoretical expectations for this explanation are low: we
predict that prime causality is not due to conditions--whether
political or cultural-that are peculiarly "German," "French," or
"Dutch." The fact that hostility is endemic to the states of northern and Western Europe at comparable levels suggests that better
answers to the problem are found in more universal conditions.
Economic Vulnerability

One of the key universal conditions affecting Western European countries in the 1980s and 1990s was the increasing insecurity of individuals employed in traditional economic sectors.
Hans-Georg Betz argues that the rapid modernization and globalization of domestic industries in those two decades led to the
creation of a "two-thirds society" in which the prosperity and
security of a large majority in certain core industries came at the
expense of a "marginalized periphery" with insecure and underpaid positions (1990, 48). Accompanying the economic transformation was the creation of new sets· of social forces divided
along the "two-thirds" dichotomy. On the one hand, much of the
majority of the population has moved beyond economic concerns
and come to embrace "postmaterial," quality-of-life issues (Inglehart 1997). On the other hand, the Modemisierungsverlierer
("losers of modernization"}-the young, the elderly, the uneducated, farmers, and unskilled and semi-skilled workers-have
purportedly turned en masse to the parties of the new radical
right in an "expression of protest over unrepresented political
demands" (Dalton 1990, 174). A variation on this theme attributes the hostility of these groups more explicitly to economic
VOL. 31 2003
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self-interest and inter-group competition, arguing that it is the
endemic population who are most likely to face direct job competition from foreign and immigrant labor (e.g., Glazer and
Moynjhan 1970; Bonacich 1972; Bobo 1983; see Sears and Funk
1991 for an overview). From either the economic competition or
industrial modernization perspectives, however, those workers in
the most vulnerable economic positions are posited to manifest
the hlghest level of hostility to foreign and immigrant labor.
Economic vulnerability arguments have found significant
support in the literature. For example, in their study on class and
guestworkers in Western Europe, Castles and Kosack (1985)
concluded that working-class hostility towards guestworkers in
Western Europe was a product of the need to protect social and
economic interests threatened by the presence of foreign workers
in the marketplace. As early as the late 1960s, Butler and Stokes
(1974) found that concerns with unemployment were highly correlated with negative attitudes towards immigrants. More recent
studies have similarly found elevated levels of hostility among
individuals with less optimistic assessments of their economic
situation (Hoskin 1985; Institut fiir angewandte Sozialwissenschafl 1987; Legge 1996; Pettigrew 1998). These studies are
consistent with studies conducted in the American context that
have shown a strong connection between hostility and perceptions ofthe economy (Harwood 1983; Simon 1987).
The literature suggests that there are two general types of
economic vulnerability connected to anti-immigrant hostility.
The first-the "losers of modernization" vulnerability-reflects
individual positions that are vulnerable from an objective standpoint. The second kind of vulnerability deals with subjective assessments of individual insecurity and vulnerability. Since there
is not necessarily a connection between structure and attitudes,
these two indicators can be considered both operationally and
conceptually distinct. To determine their relative importance and
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL _SCIENCE
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their particular effect on hostility, both forms of economic vulnerability are used in the present study.
Ideology and Value Orientation

The findings on economic vulnerability have been contradicted by other studies that have found economic variables to be
relatively insignificant. For example, Quillian (1995, 587-588)
argues that, "The empirical evidence on prejudice .. .demonstrates
only a weak link between individual interests and prejudice .. . [economic] self-interest theories cannot explain the existence of prejudice among individuals whose interests are not
directly in conflict with the subordinate group." Many of the
studies that question the economics-hostility connection place
heavy emphasis on a variety of forms of ideological attributes.
To begin with, there are those who look to traditional left-right
identification for explanations of a willingness to accept immigrants and other minorities. Hoskin (1985), Meertens and Pettigrew ( 1997), and Pettigrew (1998), for example, all found that
the more prejudiced against immigrants in Europe tended to be
more conservative politically, while Lahav (1997) discovered
that party affiliations and traditional ideological orientations
were the most important determinants of attitudes towards the
immigration issue, at least among elites.
Sill others have postulated that new forms of value orientation, especially Inglehart's (1997) "postrnaterialism" thesis, are
better at explaining a range of attitudinal attributes, including
hostility to outsiders. Hoskin (1985, 194), for one, has posited
that attitudinal hostility is "unrelated to personal economic situation [or] . .. to traditional polit1cal factors such as partisanship or
ideological position ." Instead, hostility to or acceptance of guest-
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workers is a subset of the "New Politics" 4 that cuts across party,
class, and interest lines. Hoskin's initial findings in Germany
(1985)--confirmed in other surveys she conducted in the midl 980s in Britain, Canada, Germany, and the United States
(1991)-for the most part support her New Politics thesis: weak
associations of the economic variables were consistently overshadowed by value orientation in the creation of anti-immigrant
attitudes. Our study helps to evaluate the competing claims: the
"new" and "old" ideology hypotheses are directly pitted both
against each other and against the competing economic and national context arguments.
Socio-Demographic Factors
In addition to the above theoretical explanations, a sizable
body of research has evolved that highlights the role that age and
education play in the determination of hostile attitudes to outsiders. In general, these studies have shown that more prejudiced
Europeans tend to be older and less educated (e.g., Adorno et al.
1982; Hoskin 1985, 1991; Billiet and Carton 1991; Pettigrew
1998).
DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

Our study relies on data gathered in the fall of 1988 for Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom for the Eurobarometer Survey 30.5 The Barometer included
4

According to the "New Politics" hypothesis , traditional political fault lines are gradually
being overshadowed by a new set of divisions, the most important of which involves
materialist-postmaterialist value orientations.
5
In selecting cases for the analysis, the most important determinant was to use states in
which immigration patterns (in terms of periods and levels) and income levels were relatively similar . The criterion excludes Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, which
were in the past either considerably poorer than the other countries of the EU, the primary
sources of immigrants and guestworkers to other countries, or both. For this reason, our
Note continues
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a series of questions relating to attitudes towards immigrants and
"outgroups',6 in the member states of the European Union.
Independent Variables
The Eurobarometer 30 data includes ample content for operationalizing a wide range of economic, socio-demographic, and
ideological variables. Descriptive statistics for all variables are
available in Appendix A. The first theoretical alternative, national context, was operationalized through dummy variables for
each of the five countries.
Six indicators were used to test the subjective and objective
economic vulnerability hypotheses. First, income, social class,
and occupation were used to operationalize the notion of objective economic vulnerability. Income is a four-category variable
(with values from 1 to 4) based on respondents' self-placement
in one of four income quartiles, from lowest to highest. Higher
scores equal higher incomes. Similarly, Social Class is derived
from an indicator that asked respondents to place themselves in
one of five categories: (1) working class, (2) lower middle class,
(3) middle class, (4) upper middle class, or (5) upper class.7 Occupation was operationalized by reconfiguring the categories in
the Eurobarometer's occupation variable to reflect more accurately vulnerability in the postindustrial economy. Professional
analysis is limited to the northwestern states of the EU. We have chosen to analyze the
largest of these cases. The total sample is representative of the populations at large over
the age of 15 of the five countries.
6
The "out-groups" in the surveys are country-specific . They refer to those groups that
have traditionally been least accepted in each of the states. In West Germany the outgroup is the Turks ; in France , North Africans and Southeast Asians; in Netherlands,
Surinamers and Turks; in Belgium, North Africans and Turks; and in Great Britain, West
Indians and South Asians.
7
Although this self-placement is by definition "subjective," the result is more an indica tor of a respondent's objective position in the social order than of the individual's psychologically driven, subjective assessment of personal vulnerability .
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workers (those originally coded as "professionals" and
"skilled laborers") were re-coded as "not vulnerable" (value
= O); unskilled workers (those coded as "manual labor," "unskilled manual," or "unskilled office") were re-coded as
"vulnerable" (value = I); and the unemployed were re-coded
as "most vulnerable" (value = 2), reflecting their even
greater degree of occupational insecurity.
Three discrete variables were likewise used to tap subjective economic vulnerability. All three of these variables are
coded such that higher values indicate greater vulnerability
and insecurity. The first, General Economic Assessment, is
derived from an item that asks respondents, "How do .you
think the general economic situation in this country has
changed over the last 12 months?" Responses to this question are coded as (1) "got a lot better," (2) "got a little better," (3) "stayed the same," (4) "got a little worse," and (5)
"got a lot worse." The second variable, Economic Pessimism, is based on a survey item that queried respondents,
"So far as you are concerned, do you think that next year
will be better or worse than this year?" Those who responded
"better" were assigned a value of "l," those who responded
"the same" were given a score of "2," and those who answered "worse" were assigned a score of "3." Finally,
Household Economic Situation is based on an item that
tapped change in household income over the past twelve
months using the question : "How does the financial situation
of your household now compare with what it was 12 months
ago?" The response codes and values are the same as those
used for the General Economic Assessment: (1) "got a lot
better," (2) "got a little better," (3) "stayed the same," (4)
"got a little worse," and (5) "got a lot worse." Together, these
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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three variables provide a good overall assessment of an individual's subjective economic vulnerability. 8
For the ideological variables, "traditional" political ideology
is measured through the Barometer's collapsed left-right selfplacement variable using the following five categories: 1 = extreme left, 2 = left, 3 = center, 4 = right, and 5 = extreme right.
"New" ideology, in tum, is measured through the survey's threecategory Value Orientation variable (1 = "materialist," 2 =
"mixed," and 3 = "postmaterialist"). Racism is measured by an
index based on respondents' reactions to two statements detailing
possible "reasons for why the outgroup community [i.e., Turks in
Germany, North Africans in France, etc.] does not do as well as
nationals [i.e., Germans in Germany]":
l.

"[The outgroup members] come from less
able races and this explains why they are not
as well off as most [German] people."

2. "The cultures of the home countries of [outgroup membus] are less well developed
than that of[Germany] ."

For each statement, respondents could choose from the following list of responses: 1 = "disagree strongly," 2 = "disagree
somewhat," 3 = "agree somewhat," and 4 = "agree strongly." A
racism score was created by combining respondents' answers on
the two items. Values thus range from 2 to 8, with higher values
indicating more racist attitudes towards outgroups. The racism

8

The relatively low correlations among these variables suggest that they are capturing
different segments of an individual's subjective economic assessment (Economic Pessimism and General Economic Assessment correlate at r = 0.20, Economic Pessimism and
Household Economic Situation correlate at r =0.26, while General Economic Assessment
and Household Econ()mic Situation correlate at r = 0.26).
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variable is a reliable summated sca1e9 and will play an important
role in the multivariate regressions, given that we are interested
in the extent to which social and policy hostility operate beyond
racist attitudes.
Control Variables
Three socio-demographic control variables are employed in
this study-age, education, and ethnicity. Both Age and Education are measured using the collapsed four-category items included in the Barometer. Age is coded as "1" = 24 years and
younger, "2" = 25 to 39 years, "3" = 40 to 54 years, and "4" = 55
years and older. Education is coded according to the age of respondents when they finished their full-time education: "l" = 15
years of age or younger, "2" = 16 to 19 years year of age, "3" =
20 years of age or older, and "4" = still studying. Ethnicity uses a
pre-designed measure meant to tap the respondent's ethnic origins with the question, "Is anyone in your immediate family, including yourself, of foreign national origins?" Values are coded
as "1" = "outgroup origin," "2" = "other foreign origin," and "3" =
"not of foreign origin."
Dependent Variables

The broad range of items on attitudes towards immigrants and
guestworkers in Eurobarometer 30 presents the opportunity for
constructing sophisticated scales for the two dependent variables.
The desire for a conceptually nuanced analysis led us to choose
to look at hostility in two distinct manifestations. The first, re9

While this index has a great deal of face validity, we also assessed its suitability as a
summated rating scale by calculating Cronbach's a reliability coefficient Nunally (1978)
suggests that a coefficients should be around 0.70 for a scale to demonstrate internal
consistency. Our scale obtained an a of 0.67. This is an acceptable score given the relatively low number of items on our scale, and the tendency for a to increase with higher
item numbers (Spector 1982). Consequently, we are confident that our scale is a valid
index of racist attitudes.
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ferred to as "social hostility," focuses on respondents' assessments of the effect of outsiders on society; the second, referred
to as "policy hostility," is based on the respondents' attitudes
about the appropriate political status of those outsiders.
The Barometer contained eight items that were thought prima_
facie to tap social hostility, and three that were thought to measure policy hostility. In order to corroborate the face validity of
these assumptions, all eleven items were entered into a factor
analysis, which confirmed the existence of two distinct factors. 10
The social hostility indicator is based on a series of eight
items that ask for respondents' opinions about the outgroup
members' effect on various aspects of society. In particular, respondents were asked whether each of the following statements
applied to people of the outgroup nationality residing in the respondent's nation:
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

"If there are a lot of their children in a school it reduces the level of education."
"They exploit social security benefits."
"Their customs are difficult to understand."
"Their presence in our country increases unemployment for [nationals)."
"Their presence is one of the causes of delinquency
and violence."
"Marriage into one of these groups always ends
badly."
"To have people of another nationality as neighbors
creates problems."
"The presence of people of another nationality as
neighbors modifies the prices of property."

10

A Varimax rotated factor analysis provided two easily identifiable separate factors.
The first factor included component loadings no lower than 0.5 I 6 for the eight items used
on the Social Hostility scale (see above) while the three Policy Hostility items (see below)
loaded at no higher than 0.217. For the second factor, all three Policy Hostility items
loaded no lower than 0.690 while the eight Social Hostility items loaded no higher than
0.321.
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Respondents were permitted to give either "yes" or "no" responses to all eight questions. Positive responses to each of these
questions are considered hostile and given a score of" 1." Negative responses, in tum, are not hostile; each negative response
comes with a score of "O." To create the composite measure of
Social Hostility, respondents' scores on the eight items were
summed. The social hostility variable thus ranges from "O" (not
hostile ) to "8" (highly socially hostile). The Cronbach's a. of
0.78 indicates that the scale is highly reliable (Nunnally 1978;
Spector 1982).
Policy Hostility taps a stronger sentiment. It refers to feelings
of aversion towards the presence of foreigners in the five nations
under consideration. Specifically, it refers to a desire for the circumscription of the foreigners' rights, their expulsion, or both.
Three items are used to construct the policy hostility scale. They
asked respondents their opinions about the number of immigrants in the country, whether their presence was beneficial, and
whether their rights should be circumscribed. The three questions
were recoded to provide equal weight for similar responses. The
politically hostile questions, with their respective range of answers, are the following:
•

•

•

"Generally speaking, how do you feel about the nwnber
of people of another nationality living in our country:
Are there too many [recoded value = "3"], a lot but not
too many [value= "I '1,or not many [value= "O"]?"
[falking about people living in our country who are neither (nationality) nor citizens of the European Community] "Do you think we should: extend their rights
[value= "O"], restrict their rights [value= "3"], or leave
things as they are [value= "I"]?"
[[al.king about people living in our country who are neither (nationality) nor citizens of the European Community] "Do you think that their presence here is a good
thing [value = "O''], good to some extent [value = "I"],
bad to some extent [value= "2'1, or a bad thing for the
futureof our country [value= "3"]?"
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TABLE 1
ATTITUDEFREQUENCIESFOR
COLLAPSEDSOCIAL AND POLICYHOSTILITYVARIABLES

Social
Policy
Percent
Percent
N
N
Not Hostile
4212
21.9
929
77.9
881
40.9
1735
Partially Hostile
16.3
37.2
Hostile
5.8
312
1579
5405
4243
Total N =
Source: Data derivedfrom Eurobarometer30
Note: PearsonCorrelationbetweenthe two scales is .31 (p < .0 I).
Attitude

individuals from responding to the social hostility items in a
manner that reflected their true feelings. That is, a type of "social
correctness" may have suppressed "inappropriate" responses and
obscured accurate results. Such is, in fact, the hypothesis of the
"new" or "symbolic" racism scholars. 12 Some may also wonder if
policy hostility is merely an uncensored version of social hostility. An ANOVA test of the social and policy hostility scales on
racism, however, allows us to dismiss any such concems. 13 This
12

For an introduction to such hypotheses in the American context, see McConahay and
Hough (1976) . Their primary hypothesis is that because of the social undesirability of
racial prejudice, people favor disguised , indirect ways to express it. We are not so interested here in how people may hide their prejudices; rather, we are concerned with overt
manifestations of socially and politically hostile attitudes.
13
To complete this test, a separate variable combining values for the social and policy
hostility scales was created . The variable included five categories : (I) those who were
"not hostile" on both hostility scales, (2) those who were "partially hostile" on one or
both of the dependent variables, (3) those who were "hostile" on the social hostility scale
but "not hostile" on the policy hostility scale, (4) those who were politically "hostile" but
socially "not hostile," and (5) those who were "hostile" on both scales. Since there were
only four "only socially hostile" cases, these were counted as missing values . The composite variable was then used in an ANOVA test as an independent variable with the
racism variable ~ependent. In order to make a claim that an expression of policy hostility
Note continues
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To create the composite measure of Policy Hostility, respondents' scores on the three items were summed. The scale has a
Cronbach's a reliability coefficient of .718, indicating a reliable
scale. Values range from "0" (not hostile) to "9" (high policy
hostility).
RESULTS

To facilitate preliminary visual comparisons between the two
forms of hostility, we temporarily created collapsed versions of
the two scales for use in Tables 1 and 2. For social hostility, respondents were placed into one of three recoded categories:
those with scores between "0" and "2" on the social hostility
scale were recoded as "not hostile;" those with scores between
"3" and "5" were labeled "partially hostile;" and those with
scores between "6" and "8" were recoded as "hostile." The collapsed policy hostility variable was recoded for those with a
score between "0" and "2" (i.e., with no or very minor levels of
hostility) as "not hostile;" those with scores between "3" and "5"
as "partially hostile;" and those with scores between "6" and "9"
as "hostile."
The results in Table 1 lend empirical credence to the distinctiveness of social and policy hostility. Most optimistically, only
6% of the respondents are socially hostile, and more than threequarters are not hostile. These figures are in sharp contrast to the
results for policy hostility. Surprisingly, 3 7% of the respondents
in the survey are politically hostile to the presence of the outsiders, 11 while only 22% can be classified as not hostile.
The disparity between social and policy hostility may lead to
questions whether prevailing social mores have prevented some
11

As a convention, both "policy hostility" and "politically hostile" refer to the same
phenomenon.
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test suggested that, in tenns of racism, the distinction between
social and policy hostility is well founded: those who were "hostile" on both hostility scales were significantly more racist than
those who were "hostile" only on the policy hostility scale. The
implication is that policy hostility is not merely a "disguised"
version of social hostility.
The analysis can now tum to testing the three competing hypotheses: economic situation, ideology, and national context.
Table 2 presents the results from a cross-tabulation of the collapsed versions of both dependent variables by country. The
comparison allows us to ascertain whether there is any connection between nation and levels of hostility. The data reveal a
general similarity among countries with only minor deviations.
Specifically, the same overall pattern of a high proportion of "not
hostile" in terms of social hostility and a low proportion of "not
hostile" in terms of policy hostility that was seen in Table 1 is
duplicated in Table '.2.The most noteworthy of the deviations is
the relatively low levels of social hostility in the Netherlands and
Germany, and that of the Netherlands concerning policy hostility.
Also surprising is the finding that while Germany is one of the
least socially hostile of the five countries, at the same time it is
the second-most hostile country in the policy sense. Overall,
though, there is only minor variation across nations. It is unlikely
that specific national context provides the best explanation. To
is not merely a disguised way of expressing the more socially unacceptable view of social
hostility, the results should demonstrate statistically significant differences in the racism
scores of the different values of the composite hostility variable (especially between the
"only politically hostile" and the "hostile" categories). In fact, there was a significant
difference between the scores of all the categories, with F = 135.00 (p s; 0.000) . In addition, there is a pattern of increasing racism all the way from the "not hostile" category to
the "hostile" category. Most importantly, "socially and politically hostile" respondents
were significantly more racist than "only politically hostile" respondents were. In short,
there were statistically significant mean differences of racism between all of the hostility
categories , with mean racism levels increasing for subsequent levels of the combined
hostility scale.
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TABLE2
COLLAPSED
SOCIALANDPOLICYHOSTILITY
SCALESBY
NATION
(in percents)
NetherFrance Belgium lands Germany
UK
Hostility
Social
Not Hostile 73.9
72.9
83.5
83.4
76.4
16.7
14.7
13.3
16.7
Partially Hostile 20.1
Hostile
6.9
6.0
10.4
1.9
3.3
N= 1001
1051
1323
1024
1006
Policy
Not Hostile 26.5
18.0
30.9
14.7
19.6
35.8
48.4
43 .3
43.8
Partially Hostile 32.4
42 .0
36.6
Hostile 41.1
46.2
20 .7
N=
807
825
809
1001
801
Source: Data derived from Eurobarometer30

demonstrate this more conclusively, though, all three explanations are explored simultaneously.
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations of all the independent
variables with the non-collapsed social hostility scale (values
from 0 to 8) and policy hostility scale (values from 0 to 9). The
correlations allow an initial comparison of the three competing
explanations for hostility. What emerges is the clear dominance
of the "ideology" explanation of hostility and the relatively
weaker performance of both the "national context" and "economic situation" explanations.
The two highest correlations with social hostility (and the
only two, besides education, with a correlation greater than 0.10)
are value orientation (-0.17) and racism (0.25). Materialist orientations and racist attitudes are thus highly associated with
socially hostile attitudes. The "old" ideology variable has a
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TABLE3
SoCIAL AND POLICY HOSTILITY

wrrn

IDEOLOGICAL,

NATION, AND Socio-DEMOGRAPHIC

EcONOMIC,

VARIABLES

(Pearson Correlations)
Predictors

Social

Policy

0.087t
-0. 168t
0.250t

0.234t
-0.287t
0.376:t

General EconomicAssessment
EconomicPessimism
HouseholdEconomicSituation
Income
Social Class
Occupation

0.067t
0.065t
0.074t
-0.049+
-0.083t
0.017

0.042t
0.090t
0.082t
-0.066+
-0.11 It
0.024

France
Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
Britain

0.058t
-0.087t
0.088t
-0.056+
-0.002

0.020
0.045t
0.J09t
-0.135+
-0.035t

Education
Age
Ethnicity

-0.141+
0.086t
0.071:t

-0.242+
0.139t
0.134:t

Ideology

Ideology(left-rightself-placement)
Value Orientation
Racism
Economic Situation

Nation

Socio-demographic

tP 5 0.05 (two-tailed)

tP5 0.QI (two-tailed)

correlation of only 0.09, indicating that right-wing orientations
are positively related to hostile attitudes. Correlations for the
nation dummy variables, in contrast, range from a low of -0.002
(not significant) for Britain to an absolute high of 0.09 for Belgium and Germany. In these bivariate analyses, the preliminary
evidence suggests that the national context hypothesis is not as
powerful as the ideological hypothesis. Moreover, the strength of
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the economic vulnerability thesis appears to be on par with the
national context argument. Although the "subjective" vulnerability variables are slightly more highly correlated with social hostility than the "objective" variables, neither obtains correlations
as strong as the ideological variables. Correlations range from a
low of 0.02 (not significant) for the occupation variable to a high
of -0.08 for social class. Rounding out the analysis, ethnicity and
age obtain moderate correlations of 0.07 and 0.09, respectively.
A similar pattern obtains with policy hostility, except that the
results are even more favorable for the ideological arguments
than they were with social hostility. The three strongest variables, in fact, are racism (0.38), value orientation (-0.29), and
traditional left-right ideology (0.23).
The three socio-demographic variables-education (-0.24),
age (0.14), and ethnicity (0.13}-obtain generally more important correlations with policy hostility. Among the economic predictors, the only variable with a Pearson correlation over 0.10 is
social class (-0.11), while among the nation variables, only the
Netherlands (-0.14) and Belgium (0.11) obtain such a correlation.
The data show that-without the benefit of controls-neither
national context nor economic situation offers a convincing explanation of social and policy hostility towards immigrants. Instead, education and ideology seem to hold the keys to this
puzzle. Moreover, racism might be expected to be a more powerful explicator than value orientation, and value orientation
should in tum be more powerful than traditional left-right ideology. In order to determine the relative importance of the three
competing explanations, however, the analysis must tum to the
multiple regression results for social and policy hostility.
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Table 4 reports the results from multiple regressions on the
non-collapsed social and policy hostility scales. 14 The Beta
weights (standardized coefficients) included in the table allow us
to detennine the relative impact of each of the independent variables. In general, the results show the same patterns evident in
the uncontrolled bivariate correlations of Table 3: the ideological
variables are better predictors of levels of hostility than are national or economic factors. 15
For social hostility, the two strongest predictors are racism
and value orientation, respectively. One of the nation variables,
France, does have a significant, positive relationship with social
hostility: it is the third most powerful variable in the equation.
The results show no statistically significant differences between
Great Britain, Germany, and Holland, however. After racism,
value orientation, and France, six other variables obtain statistical significance with roughly equivalent explanatory value. The
traditional ideology variable, as expected, is positively associated with hostility. Three economic variables obtain significance:
general economic assessment, household economic situation, and
social class. Of the socio-demographic indicators, education displays a negative relationship with socially hostile attitudes, and
ethnicity is positively related to social hostility. Those who are of
14

A Pearson correlation matrix showed that inter-predictor collinearity was not problematic . The two strongest inter-correlations were between education and age (-.44), and
between education and social class (.35).
15
The items used to construct the racism variable were not asked in Belg ium. Because of
the importance of the variable to the test, we decided to run the multivariate regressions
without the Belgian respondents . As a precaution, regressions on social and policy hostility were also run with the racism variable excluded . The only difference in the results on
the social hostility equation was that Germany obtains a significant negative relationship ,
while the only differences in the policy hostility equation are that income becomes insignificant and occupation attains a significant positive relationship (p = .01). The relative
importance of all other variables in the two equations remained unchanged . In short, the
general pattern of re::•1ltswassimilar.

VOL. 31 2003

126

SAXTON & BENSON

foreign origins, and those who are more educated, are less likely
to possess hostile attitudes towards immigrants.
As indicated by the adjusted R 2 of .11, approximately 11% of
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the combined effect of the 15 independent variables. By all accounts, one
TABLE4
REGRESSIONANALYSF-SOF SOOALAND POLICYHOSilI.JTY

Social Hostility
Adj . R2 =0.11
Std.
Beta
Error

Policy Hostility
Adj . R2 = 0.28
Std.
Error

Beta

Ideology
0.043t 0.037
-0. I 12t 0.059
0.195+ 0.022

0.192t
-0.l 75t
0.262+

0.048
0.077
0.030

0.060t
0.012
0.045t
0.01
-0.047t
0.002

0.041
0.055
0.043
0.035
0.039
0.064

0.024
0.065t
0.031
0.043t
-0.046t
0.028

0.053
0.072
0.056
0.047
0.052
0.085

0.1llt

0.113

0.030 0.113

0.122t
0. 134t
-0.003

0.148
0.145
0.147

Education -0.059t 0.050
Age -0.003 0.041
Ethnicity 0.052t 0.092
Constant -0.014 0.445

-0.120t
-0.003
0.049t
1.533

0.066
0.054
0.121
0.588+

Ideology
Value Orientation
Racism
Economic Situation
GeneralEconomicAssessment
Economic Pessimism
HouseholdEconomicSituation
Income
Social Class
Occupation
Nation
France

Gennany -0.010 0.109
Holland
Socio-demographic

= 2322;
Policy Hostility : n = 1968). As the base category, the UK dummy variable was
excluded . All coefficients (except for the constant) are standardized .
tp $ 0.05 (two-tailed)
tP$ 0.01 (two-tailed)
Source: Base data derived from Eurobarometer 30 (Social Hostility : n
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should expect better results when using such normally powerful
predictors as ideology, education, and racism. Plausibly, the results are an indication that the issue cuts across traditional lines;
this would lend credence to the "New Politics" hypothesis. As in
Table 3, the strength of the associations with the policy hostility
scale is greater. Once again , ideology offers a stronger explanation of hostility than either economic situation or national context. These results parallel the findings of the bivariate
correlations. In total, 10 of 15 variables attained statistical significance in this model. Comparing Beta weights, the three most
powerful are racism, traditional left-right ideology, and value
orientation. Racism offers the most cogent explanation of the
three. More relevant is the finding that value orientation and leftright ideology carry roughly equal explanatory weight with regard to levels of policy hostility . This finding may have an important implication: the political battle over the future of the
guestworkers is neither merely a matter of "New Politics" nor is
it solely a reflection of a split along traditional ideological lines.
Two of the nation dummy variables, Germany and France, are
the fourth- and fifth-most powerful variables in the equation.
Residing in either of these two countries makes a respondent
more likely to bold hostile policy attitudes towards immigrants.
Education closely follows these two variables, with ethnicity not
far behind. Age does not appear to play a significant part in either socially or politically hostile attitudes. The statistical unimportance of age is counter to many theoretical arguments.
According to Legge ( 1996) "while some research has found a
positive relationship between age and ethnocentrism ... one might
expect a negative relationship as well" (522). In the German context, Legge maintains that "the elderly have a higher probability
of being satisfied economically; in turn, a greater economic satisfaction should result in less anxiety towards non-Germans"
(522). At the same time, older Europeans are more likely to be
VOL.
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less educated , more conservative ideologically, and hold more
materialist value orientations. We believe that it is understandable that age drops out of the causal picture, when controlling for
education, ideology, postmaterialist value orientations, and economic competition. Thus, the non-significant coefficient for the
age variable is likely because of multicollinearity. While age
does not highly correlate individually with any of the other independent variables, an auxiliary regression illustrates that the
combined effects of the independent variables have an important
dampening effect on the impact of age on both Social and Policy
Hostility. 16
As in the social hostility equation, three economic variables
obtain significant relationships with policy hostility: economic
pessimism, income, and social class. Although we expected the
economic variables to correlate with levels of attitudinal hostility, the findings do not support those expectations. The results do
not correspond to those studies that claim economic variables are
the most important determinants of hostile attitudes. 17

16

Klein's rule of thumb suggests that if the If from an auxiliary regression is greater
than the overall If , then multicollinearity is likely a problem (Gujarati 1995). Indeed , the
If for the auxiliary regress ion of Age is 0.29, as compared to the overall If of0 . 11 for the
Social Hostility Regression and an If of 0.28 for the Policy Hostility regression. No such
evidence was found for the Occupation variable (auxiliary If= 0.11). While mulicollinearity reduces the significance of affected variables, it does not adversely affect the estimated coefficients in other ways.
17
Both models were also estimated using Huber/White corrected standard errors to control for the possibility of heteroscedasticity . The results are not presented in this article .
However, there was no difference in the significance of statistics for the Policy Hostility
model with corrected standard errors. The only difference in the Social Hostility model is
that ideology drops top= 0.065 from p = 0.044 for a two-tailed significance test. Consequently , the uncorrected standard errors are presented in Table 4.
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CONCLUSIONSAND IMPLICATIONS

We posited the existence of two distinct forms of attitudinal
hostility towards immigrant "outsiders" in the developed West.
The first, social hostility, encompasses hostile assessments of the
immigrants' impact on the host society. The second, policy hostility, entails support for anti-immigrant public policies. The results show that not only are social and policy hostility distinct,
but that neither is simply a disguised form of racism.
We tested three competing explanations of social and policy
hostility: national context, economic vulnerability, and ideology.
Theoretical expectations were low for the national context accounts of attitudinal hostility. The data suggest that the answer to
attitudinal hostility does not lie purely in factors peculiar to the
individual nation-states of the European Union. Not only did an
examination of the raw data reveal a basic similarity in patterns
of both social and policy hostility across nations, but also the
controlled multivariate regressions confirmed that the overall
strength of the relationship between nation and hostility is relatively weak.
There is a large body of literature suggesting that economic
vulnerability should prove to be the most powerful determinant
of hostile attitudes. Our data do not support this assumption. Despite the fact that conceptualizations of both subjective and objective economic vulnerability were used to test these variables,
neither was shown to offer a more significant account of variation in levels of hostility than ideology and education. At the
same time, the results offer partial confirmation of the economic
competition and economic vulnerability arguments. Though the
picture is mixed, there is a general relationship between an individual holding less optimistic evaluations of the economy and
that individual holding hostile attitudes towards immigrants.
Similarly, two "objective" indicators of economic vulnerability,
income, and social class, obtain significance in one or both of the
VOL.
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multivariate regressions. These figures show that as both the
economic vulnerability and economic competition arguments
suggest, those with higher incomes and those at the higher strata
of society are less likely to possess hostile attitudes.
The three socio-demographic variables-age,
ethnicity, and
education - have likewise been posited as both fundamental aspects of vulnerability and essential determinants of hostility. As
expected, ethnicity was shown to be an important predictor of
hostility, and education was repeatedly one of the strongest overall determinants of hostile attitudes . This is consistent with a
wide array of literature on the power of education. 18
The findings further suggest that education appears to be a
key ingredient in the Modernisierungsverlierer's (the young, the
elderly, unskilled and semiskilled workers, farmers, and those
with low levels of education) purported hostility to outsiders.
The present study found no significant relationships between
hostility and either age or occupation. However, the insignificant
finding for age was likely due to multicollinearity from the combined effects of the remaining independent variables. On the
whole, given the effects of education and social class, only partial support was found for the objective economic vulnerability,
or "losers of modernization," explanation of hostility.
Our study suggests that the most compelling explanation of
hostility is ideology. The troika of racism, value orientation, and
left-right ideology holds greater explanatory utility than either
economics or national context. Racism, predictably, was found to
be the most important determinant of hostile social and political
attitudes towards immigrants. Both traditional left-right ideology
18

Education is, in fact, partially an "economic" variable, since it aetennines future income, but it is related to so many other {attitudinal, social, cultural, ideological) factors
that it should be assumed unique. Hyman, Wright, and Reed ( 1975) were among the first
to document, as their book title suggests, the Enduring Effects of Education .
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and value orientation have a significant impact on hostility beyond the effects of racism. Traditional left-right ideology was the
second-strongest predictor of politically hostile attitudes, while
value orientation was the second or third most powerful predictor variable for both forms of hostility. Controlling for racism,
the more materialist the value orientation and the more right
wing the ideology, the more hostile the attitudes.
The connection between ideology and hostility is paralleled
in the United States. According to some analysts, racial politics
in the United States during the pre-Civil Rights era were simple
conflicts between lofty American ideals and lowly prejudice:
whites' responses to race issues could be reduced to how they
felt about blacks. In contemporary American politics, however,
one cannot infer that attitudes towards any particular policy issue
can be construed as a "litmus test" of whites' feelings about
blacks. The majority of whites are for direct government assistance (e.g., the Head Start program) and anti-discrimination
laws, yet against bussing and affirmative action. Sniderman and
Piazza ( 1993, 16) refer to this diversity of opinion as "issue pluralism." Ideology effectively mediates the presence or absence of
prejudice in such policy-relevant attitudes. It is plausible that
analogous forces are at work in the EU.
These findings also lend credence to the "New Politics" hypothesis that Europe is undergoing a shift towards a political
split along the materialist-postmaterialist fault line. 19 Value orientation indeed proved to be a robust predictor of attitudinal hostility. At the same time, the evidence shows the value-orientation
cleavage supplements-but
in no way supplants-traditional
19

The New Politics hypothesis refers only to the policy arena. Social attitudes, as manifest here in social hostility, are not affected by the same process . Our results suggest that
value orientation trumps traditional ideology as a primary determinant of socially hostile
attitudes .
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political dividing lines. Deep-rooted prejudices and left-right
ideology remain powerful determinants of hostility in the policy
arena

In the end, our results show that attitudinal hostility derives
from the conjunction of low levels of education and a powerful
form of "ideological hostility" encompassing old-fashioned racist attitudes, traditional right-wing ideology, and materialist value
orientations. The issue of immigration in Europe has become
firmly embedded in ideology. Neither economics nor national
context offers as convincing an explanation of the genesis of
hostile attitudes .
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY STATISTICS-ALL
Variable
Policy Hostility
Soc ial Hostility
Ideology
Value Orientation
Racism
General Economic Assessment
Economic Pessimism
Household Economic Situation
Income
Social Class
Occupation
France
Germany
Belgium
Holland
Britain
Education
Age
Ethnici!}'.

Obs.
4208
5405
4856
5108
2536
5264
5143
5291
4399
5020
5319

5405
5405
5405
5405

5405
5405

5395
4028

VARIABLES*
Std.
Mean
Dev. Min Mu

7.567
1.425
2.990
1.961
3.863
2.893
1.815
3.024
2.466
2.336
1.355
0.185
0.194
0. 189
0. 186
0.245
2.086
2.586
2.760

2.482
1.881
1.050
0.654
1.733
0.932
0.697
0.899
1.125
1.116
0.608
0 .388
0.396
0.392
0.389
0.430
0.921
1,078
0.481

0
0

9

8

5
1
2

3

8

5
3

5
4

I
l
0
0
0
0
0
1

5
3

4
4
3

•The summary statistics for these variables are derived from all available data
in the Eurobarometer 30 data set.
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